ABSTRACT: In this chapter, a learning account is discussed as a potential explanation for the symptoms in multiple chemical sensitivity. Clinical evidence is scarce and anecdotal. A laboratory model provides more convincing results.
INTRODUCTION
Several excellent reviews on multiple chemical sensitivity (MCS; or idiopathic environmental intolerance, IEI) [1] [2] [3] [4] and special issues of journals d document its symptoms, prevalence, prognostic course, and possible pathogenic mechanisms. Two major features characterize this syndrome: (1) the presence of a wide variety of nonspecific subjective symptoms, such as fatigue and weakness, cognitive difficulties (concentration and memory), dizziness, pounding heart, shortness of breath, anxiety, headache, and muscle tension; 5,e and (2) a spatiotemporal relationship between the symptoms and the presence of (often odorous) chemical substances that are often structurally unrelated and at doses below those known to cause harmful effects in the population. 10 Thus, the basic questions regarding MCS are as follows: what is the origin of these symptoms and how can the link with chemical substances be explained?
In the present chapter, we will discuss the evidence for one potential explanation, namely Pavlovian conditioning. The evidence will not be discussed in the context of an antithesis between psychologic and biologic explanations. Such an antithesis is, we believe, counterproductive. First, the subjective symptoms of MCS are by definition the result of psychologic processes. Part of their input may come from biologic dysregulation and part may come from mental processes, but perceptualcognitive processes of symptom perception and interpretation are the final route to all subjective symptoms. Second, Pavlovian conditioning should be regarded as an adaptive psychobiologic process. The salivation of Pavlov's dog is a biologic response, and the mental processes that trigger it have a biologic substrate. The difference between a psychologic and a biologic explanation is therefore mainly a matter of level of description. Nevertheless, these different levels may suggest quite different approaches to treatment. In this chapter, we will argue that evidence for a Pavlovian conditioning hypothesis is accumulating, that it has great explanatory power, and that it offers interesting treatment options.
THE PAVLOVIAN CONDITIONING HYPOTHESIS OF MCS
In its simplest form, Pavlovian conditioning relies on the co-occurrence of two events. An unconditional stimulus (US; e.g., a toxic exposure or another traumatic event) may trigger an unconditional response (UR; e.g., an array of bodily responses and subjective symptoms). The occurrence of this US in a spatiotemporal relationship with a neutral f stimulus (a conditioned stimulus, CS; e.g., an odor or harmless chemical) may endow the CS with the capacity to elicit UR-like responses that, at that moment, become conditioned responses (CRs) ( see FIG. 1 ).
We translated this simple Pavlovian schema into a laboratory model in order to test whether subjective symptoms induced by a physiological challenge in association with a harmless odoring chemical could be elicited by presenting the latter stimulus only. The basic model implied the administration of a number of breathing trials of two minutes each ( see FIG. 2 ). Air enriched with 7.5% CO 2 served as a respiratory US and two odors as CSs, for example, dilute ammonia and niaouli (a mixture containing mainly eucalyptus oil). In the learning phase, subjects breathed one odor mixed with CO 2 (called the CS+ trial) and the other odor mixed with room air (called the CS− trial).
In the test phase, the breathing trials contained the odors only, that is, there was no CO 2 . Respiratory frequency, tidal volume, end-tidal fractional concentration of CO 2 , and heart rate were measured throughout the experiment and subjective symptoms were registered after each trial. Often, conscious awareness of the contingency relationship between the CS+ odor and the experienced symptoms during the acquisition phase was also registered.
f A CS is not necessarily neutral in an absolute way, but in a relative way in that it does not elicit the same URs as the US by itself.
This experimental model replicates important features of MCS: (1) it involves human subjects; (2) the major dependent variable consists of a variety of subjective symptoms; (3) CO 2 inhalation may represent a conceptual analogue for a toxic exposure; and (4) harmless odoring chemicals are introduced to serve as elicitors of the symptoms.
In addition, both bodily responses and subjective symptoms are measured, allowing investigation of the concordance/divergence among the two sets of responses. An important methodological advantage is also that the conditioning effect can be tested both within subject and within odor, meaning that the subject and the odor serve as their own controls. The following results were obtained in a series of experiments:
(1) After a few pairings of the CS+ odor with CO 2 , presenting the CS+ odor alone altered respiratory behavior and induced elevated levels of somatic symptoms "as if the subjects were still breathing CO 2 ". 11-15 (2) The learning effect was selective: conditioning effects only occurred to foul-smelling ammonia as CS+ odor and not to neutral/pleasant-smelling niaouli as CS+ ( see FIG. 2 ). When both CS odors were foul smelling (irritant ammonia and nonirritant butyric acid), learned symptoms emerged to both, suggesting that affective valence of the odors was the critical variable for the selective association effect. 11-14 (3) The learning effect was specific: no conditioning effects appeared for symptoms usually not provoked by CO 2 ("dummy symptoms") and the effects could not be explained by conditioned arousal/anxiety only. We never observed a conditioned heart rate increase, and the effects were largest for the subset of symptoms that are typically elicited by CO 2 . 12-14 (4) Conscious awareness of the relationship between the odor and CO 2 -induced symptoms was not critical for the effects to occur. For all odors used as CS+, the participants were roughly equally aware of the experimentally induced contingencies, yet they only showed conditioning effects to foul-smelling CSs. This suggests that more basic learning processes than those reflected by conscious awareness are involved. [12] [13] [14] FIGURE 2. Schema of a respiratory conditioning paradigm and a typical result (means ± SEM). 12 The specific odor used as CS+ or CS− is counterbalanced across subjects and presented in low concentrations to avoid US effects of the odors themselves. The three CS+ and three CS− trials are presented in a semirandomized order. Both phases are preceded by a baseline trial: the participant breathes through the system, but no odor or CO 2 is added.
(5) A straightforward extinction procedure, involving a series of unreinforced CS exposures, readily reduced the learned symptoms. 14 (6) Once symptoms to one odor were learned, they generalized to newly presented odors provided that they had a negative affective valence (i.e., were foul smelling). For example, subjects conditioned to have symptoms to ammonia showed elevated symptoms also to (first time presented) foulsmelling butyric acid and acetic acid, but not to fresh-smelling citric aroma. 15 (7) Mental cues and images can also serve as CSs: Merely evoking an image of a situation that was previously paired with the experience of CO 2 -induced symptoms elicited those symptoms and altered respiratory behavior. Again, negative emotional valence of the images appeared to be an important modulator: learning effects only showed up when the imagined situations were stressful. 16 (8) Although both (respiratory) symptoms and altered respiratory behavior were learned, the symptoms in the test phase were not a reflection of the actual (learned) physiologic responses. Rather, the symptoms were relying on an activated memory representation of the symptoms experienced in the acquisition phase. This activation process was automatic in that it required little or no conscious mental resources. 13 (9) Important individual differences occurred:
(a) The level of neuroticism or negative affectivity (NA) in normals modulated the conditioning effects: Learned symptoms and their generalization to new odors were, overall, more elevated in a group of subjects scoring high on negative affectivity. 13, 15 (b) The learning effects on symptoms were overall stronger in a group of "psychosomatic" patients. This suggests that psychopathological groups are more vulnerable to learning symptoms. 12 The latter findings are strikingly similar with the fact that neuroticism or NA is a risk factor for developing MCS 17 and that psychiatric populations are more likely to develop MCS. Especially high rates of MCS are found in patients suffering from medically unexplained symptoms such as chronic fatigue syndrome and fibromyalgia. 18 Overall, this set of experimental data provides strong evidence for the plausibility of a learning explanation for MCS. In general, our effects were highly reliable, although they were limited in magnitude and well below clinical levels. However, learning theory implies that much stronger USs produce stronger learning effects, reduce the likelihood of extinction, and enhance generalization. For obvious reasons, stronger USs are difficult to apply in humans for experimental purposes.
MCS WITHIN A CONTEMPORARY VIEW ON PAVLOVIAN CONDITIONING
Although the experimental model sketched above apparently represents a straightforward application of Pavlov's classical procedure, this does not mean that Pavlov's original mechanistic theoretical framework applies to explain the results. Contemporary views heavily rely on an information processing framework ( see FIG. 3 ), linking Pavlovian conditioning even to forms of causal reasoning. 18 An extensive discussion of these more liberal theoretical views is beyond the scope of this chapter. Only a few aspects will be mentioned here and their potential implications for MCS will be discussed in the next section.
If a CS is co-occurring in some regular manner with a US, an associative link with a certain strength is formed between the memory representations of the two events. A CS allows for the prediction of an upcoming US, implying the activation of the memory representation of the US, which in turn may elicit (adaptive) conditioned CRs. The associative link does not depend on actual pairings of the CS and US only, but on the informational value of other relevant events as well (see, e.g., phenomena such as blocking, latent inhibition, etc.). 19 In animals, actual events are the main source of information, but humans also possess other sources that may modulate their expectancy once a CS occurred. Davey 20 ( see FIG. 3 ), for example, lists situational, verbally and culturally transmitted information, existing beliefs, and emotions elicited by the CS.
An activated memory representation of a US does not directly translate into a response either. Learning and performance appear quite distinct phenomena: a learned association may remain behaviorally silent in some conditions and suddenly show up in other conditions. Conditioning effects may also be modulated by postconditioning manipulations. For example, when an organism has learned a tone-shock relationship, subsequent presentations of a much stronger shock alone may induce a reevaluation of the US in memory and inflate later CRs to the CS. 19 In Davey's model, 20 reevaluation of acquired associations in humans may occur through verbally transmitted information, interpretations given to interoceptive cues, cognitive rehearsal, and coping strategies ( see FIG. 3 ). In summary, several processes may modulate the formation of associative links and their translation into behavioral output. Some reviews and editorials about MCS give only brief consideration to associative learning, if at all, and subsequently dismiss it as being inadequate. Often, this is based upon an impoverished view on conditioning processes. We will elaborate on some criticisms within a contemporary view on associative learning.
CRITICISMS AND UNRESOLVED QUESTIONS

What Is the US in MCS?
The conditioning hypothesis is often rejected on the grounds that, very often, no previous toxic exposure is found in the history of an MCS patient. Referring to Pavlov's prototypical dog, Staudenmayer 21 phrased this as "where is the meat?". In other words, there would be no US. We suggest that, for instance, regular stressinduced hyperventilation episodes in a "chemical context" may act as a US in the same way as shown in our experiments with CO 2 -induced hyperventilation. However, because learning processes may loosen the link between symptoms and their physiological correlates (see above), a one-to-one relationship between hypocapnia and the presence of symptoms should not be considered critical for this hypothesis. 22 This view may explain a number of observations: (1) the origin of MCS appears in some cases to be linked to episodes of stress and not to toxic exposures; 23 (2) a substantial overlap exists among the symptoms of MCS and those of hyperventilation, such as intermittent flares of fatigue and weakness, dizziness or light-headedness, cognitive difficulties (concentration and memory), shortness of breath, sore throat, dry mouth, palpitations and "racing heart", gastrointestinal problems, and feelings of anxiety or depression; 4,9,11,24 (3) the exposure of MCS patients to their chemical trigger induced hyperventilation in 73% of them. 25 In some cases, both hyperventilation and toxic exposures may be involved. For example, a toxic exposure may be a primary US, causing conditioned symptoms and anxiety to odoring substances or specific "contaminated" environments. Subsequent exposures to the CS may induce hyperventilation as part of anticipatory anxiety, and in this way become a secondary US.
What Is the CS?
The likelihood for a given cue (CS) to become associated with a US is determined by a number of variables. One is its salience, which may in turn be influenced by culturally transmitted information, preexisting beliefs, and/or emotional reactions to available cues ( see FIG. 3 ). For example, the belief that the air is chemically polluted may facilitate associating symptoms to perceived chemicals. Even thoughts and mental images may function as CSs for learned symptoms, as was shown in one of our studies 16 (see above). The images in that study were selected as being relevant for panic, but it would be interesting to investigate mental images relevant for MCS as well. For example, imagining being in polluted places may potentially come to serve as mental CSs. As a consequence, tangible or measurable CSs may not always be present in the environment or perceivable to an outside observer. This may explain why the incidence and prevalence of MCS appear to vary between geographical areas. Although epidemiological data are scarce, MCS appears to be very much an American disease and much less a European disease. Within Europe, the distribution is likely to vary depending on the level of awareness of environmental pollution and the salience of cues.
Why Do Not All Toxic Exposures Lead to MCS?
A similar question has been dealt with extensively in the context of conditioning models of fear and anxiety: why is it that severe traumatic events produce PTSD in only 30% of the cases? 26 The probability of MCS following a US (toxic exposure or hyperventilation) may be determined by aspects of the US, the CS, characteristics of the individual, and/or their interaction. Actually, this was typically shown in a recent experiment: 15 learning effects only occurred in subjects scoring high on negative affectivity (NA) who had a foul-smelling odor (ammonia) as CS. Subjects with the same number and intensity of USs, but having had a neutral/fresh odor as CS and/or not scoring high on NA, did not show effects.
NA in MCS patients may contribute in several ways to the development of MCS. First, a toxic exposure or a hyperventilation episode may impact stronger upon persons with NA and produce stronger autonomic responses as internal responses (URs). Second, persons high on NA may interpret these URs as more threatening, thus affecting the experienced intensity. Third, NA may bias persons to link negative events (US) to negative cues in their environment (CS). Fourth, such subjects may comparatively be more affected by culturally transmitted information about the presence and toxicity of environmental chemicals and hence form more explicit preexisting beliefs in this regard. Fifth, persons with NA may be more vulnerable to postconditioning cognitive processes: worrying and catastrophical interpretations after a toxic or hyperventilatory event may increase the CRs (see below).
Why Is There No Spontaneous Extinction?
Repeated nonreinforced exposures to conditioned odors should produce extinction of the learned responses. Because most patients cannot avoid being exposed to odorous substances, the question is why do symptoms not extinguish in patients. A selection bias may operate here because only patients present themselves to doctors and hospitals, and little is known about the course of events in those subjects whose symptoms do gradually decline after a toxic accident. Also, the persistence of the symptoms may be due to extensive avoidance behavior, preventing exposure to critical cues for a duration sufficiently long to allow extinction. More importantly, however, is recent evidence showing that Pavlovian extinction does not produce unlearning. 27, 28 Rather, additional knowledge is acquired in such a procedure, implying that, in some contexts or at some moments in time, the learned CS-US relation does not hold. Conditioning, therefore, is like learning a rule (CS predicts US) and extinction is like learning contextually dependent exceptions-to-the-rule (CS predicts US, but not now/here 28 ) . Thus, what is extinguished in one context may still emerge in another.
Several processes modulating conditioning can also retard or prevent extinction, such as very intense USs in subjects high on neuroticism 29 and postconditioning pro-cesses (mental rumination, worrying, catastrophic thinking acting as reevaluations of the US; see above). To the extent that hyperventilation is involved, each new episode potentially induced by anticipatory stress will reinforce the existing association and prevent effective extinction as well.
Range of Stimuli Amenable to Generalization
Devriese et al. 15 demonstrated that learned symptoms generalized from the CS odor to newly presented odors, following stimulus valence as a generalization gradient (i.e., generalization occurred to foul-smelling odors, but not to neutral or positively valent ones). However, patients often show symptoms to perfumes, fresh odors, and even tastes and foods. Again, stronger USs than we used in our experiments may broaden the range of stimuli amenable to generalization. 30 In addition, several variables promoting blurring or forgetting about the attributes of the CS (duration, context shifts) may substantially broaden the generalization gradient. 31 Also, existing cognitive schemata may play a role. For example, the conviction that perfumes also contain certain chemicals or that both air quality and foods are contaminated by similar chemical substances may turn these items into negative ones and broaden the generalization gradient. Furthermore, the a priori conviction that a confrontation with some chemical may be dangerous may evoke anticipatory anxiety and hyperventilation, causing new conditioning experiences and establishing selffulfilling prophecies.
What Is the Actual UR/CR?
In our experiments, we applied CO 2 inhalation as a US and we registered subjective symptoms, breathing behavior, and (sometimes) heart rate as URs. In reality, a toxic exposure or other negative event as US may trigger a wide variety of URs in both mental and bodily systems, including the autonomic, immune, and endocrine responses. Up to now, little is known about the causal role of these systems to explain the symptoms of MCS patients. Indeed, observed differences in autonomic responses to odors or other stimuli between patients and normals may be a result rather than a cause of patient status or simply be correlates of higher neuroticism. Even less is known about the potential role of conditioned modulation of autonomic, immune, and endocrine responses in MCS to explain the symptoms of MCS (see Siegel and Kreutzer 32 for interesting suggestions).
It should be noted that co-occurring variations in conditioned physiological and subjective responses should not readily be interpreted as a causal path from the former to the latter. Each dependent variable may be controlled by different mechanisms, as we demonstrated in one experiment. 13 Learned respiratory symptoms still showed up when a manipulation (a reaction time task) overruled the conditioned alterations of respiratory behavior and prevented them to occur. This suggests that acquired symptoms are depending on learned perceptual-cognitive processes underlying symptom perception and not on the presence of altered respiratory behavior.
More detailed analyses of these perceptual-cognitive mechanisms in MCS patients are needed: Do MCS patients have an attentional bias towards odors and symptoms? Do they have a negative interpretation bias? Do they ruminate and/or catastrophize about causes and consequences of their illness? How do they attribute symptoms to causes? All these processes have been shown to have an important impact upon somatic symptoms and to contribute to a self-perpetuating cycle in many ways. 33 
Conditioning and (Neural) Sensitization
Neural sensitization refers to an increasing intensity of responses to stimuli, such as drugs, as a result of repeated intermittent exposure. In MCS, it is hypothesized that olfactory, limbic, mesolimbic, and related pathways of the CNS are involved. 34, 35 Sensitization effects are more likely with stronger stimuli and in conditions of physical and psychological stress. A special case is time-dependent sensitization (TDS), 36 which specifies that the increase in the response is not just a matter of repeated exposures, but also of the time interval between initial and later exposures.
Neural sensitization has been contrasted with conditioning as a potential model for MCS. 2, 34, 37 Both basic forms of learning are often distinguished as nonassociative (implying one stimulus) and associative learning (implying two stimuli becoming associated), respectively. Despite some apparent procedural differences, Ramsay and Woods 38 in an astute analysis of conditioning cogently argued that also sensitization to drugs represents a form of associative learning, provided that the proper analysis is made of what actually constitutes the US, UR, CS, and CR. g In this view, contrasting sensitization and conditioning regarding the processes involved may not be fruitful. One important difference at the procedural level, however, is that a sensitization paradigm requires a reactivity to an initial exposure of a stimulus, whereas a conditioning paradigm does not (see table 1 in Bell et al. 40 ). Given the wide variety of potential triggers of MCS symptoms, many of which are completely harmless and never before elicited even the slightest symptom, it appears reasonable to assume that a new response was learned toward a chemical rather than that a preexisting one was sensitized. In addition, for many of the hypothesized neurobiological processes in (often animal) sensitization studies, it remains to be seen how they actually relate to subjective symptoms in humans triggered by harmless chemicals.
Implications for Treatment
One of the important implications from our perspective as opposed to a toxicological view concerns the treatment options. For example, a learning perspective suggests a cognitive-behavioral approach implying exposure to the symptomprovoking stimulus, whereas toxicological or immunological reasoning may actually advise avoidance behavior. Consistent with our perspective is that systematic desensitization (SD), a behavioral treatment technique relying on extinction and counterconditioning principles, has been shown to produce positive treatment results. [41] [42] [43] Because the efficacy of a treatment is no proof of the correctness of its rationale, 37 controlled large-scale treatment studies are needed to corroborate the efficacy of cognitive-behavioral treatment for MCS. They should also assess whether the effects mainly involve reduction of associated avoidance behavior, of associated autonomic arousal, or also of the very symptoms of MCS. In addition, because extinction effects g Interoceptive cues, associated with the presence of the drug in the body, may serve as CSs. 39 Those situations may erroneously appear as nonassociative.
appear highly sensitive to contextual conditions (see above), care should be taken to enhance the generalization of extinction effects in order to improve its effectiveness. 44 
CONCLUDING REMARKS
Our laboratory experiments have convincingly documented the plausibility of an associative learning model for MCS: odor stimuli that have been associated with a physiologic challenge inducing symptoms may subsequently elicit comparable symptoms by themselves. It should be noted, however, that a Pavlovian paradigm mainly refers to a procedure stimulating the formation of associative connections, which in turn can initiate and modulate different perceptual-cognitive and physiologic processes underlying the experience of symptoms. In addition, because several external, cognitive, and emotional factors may modulate both the probability of association formation and their expression into observable effects (see above), 20 Pavlovian conditioning should not be regarded as a specific explanation, but as an open framework stimulating the search for critical processes underlying MCS symptoms.
Although the account sketched above offers testable predictions for further investigations, it implies tough challenges for the scientific community. Indeed, it has been suggested that CSs need not necessarily be observable to an outside observer; that hyperventilation may be involved as an important mechanism, but should not be present during every symptom episode; and that several hard to measure mental processes may play a critical role. However, the involvement of processes that are difficult to measure may actually be the very reason why MCS is still poorly understood.
